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Better Days In Court For a
New Day1's Problems
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December, 19683

Better Days in Court for a New Day's Problems
Hon. Roger J. Traynor*
The accelerating force of social and scientific change is now an
old story, kept up-to-date with country-wide daily bulletins. The
relatively phlegmatic acceleration in legal concepts and procedures
is also an old story but not so well known as it needs to be. Perhaps
this inquiry at the Vanderbilt University Law School will quicken
awareness that the repercussions of a new day have induced in the
law a state of shocked stability from which it has yet to recuperate.
It is for lawyers and judges to bring it up to a strength and creativeness equal to the times. Out of the new day's commotion whirl competing interests that may spend some of their violence but none of
their force by the time they reach the courtroom. A judge who must
somehow compose their differences knows how deeply his decision
may wound one adversary or another and how sharp a line it may cut
into the future. He can no longer invoke with assurance the nearest
quieting precedent. The nearest analogy may seem to him only impertinent. Tried and half-true formulas will not serve him, for all
their show of stability. He must compose his own mind as he leaves
antiquated compositions aside to create some fragments of legal order
out of disordered masses of new data. There should be modern
ways for such a task, in fairness not only to him but to those who
must seek out his judgment and abide by his decisions.
Novel legal problems need not take him by storm if he makes a
little advance, uncloistered inquiry into what people most want out of
their lives and how they wish to live with one another. It is from
the stuff of their relationships with one another and with the state
that the common law develops, ostensibly from the cases that formalize
their quarrels, but under the surface and over the years, from the
values that formalize their aspirations.
There is abundant evidence that those aspirations go beyond the
salvage values that clutter discussion preoccupied with survival.
*Associate Justice, California Supreme Court.
A judge accustomed to working on one case at a time could have a field day free
of all footnotes on an extra-curricular assignment of broad range. He could also have a
field day with footnotes. He yields instead to an occupational tug against extremes.
The notes to this article are illustrative only; they include outside reading that proved
to be in more than one sense a congenial enlargement of the daily calendar. In
deference to that exigent calendar, though at some risk of provincialism, I have
relied heavily on cases from my own jurisdiction. Scholars will readily match them with
others and with companion treatises.
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We want more than to live past forty; we want more than to dwell
in a shelter. We are also going beyond the simple homilies of the
past, too often narcotic in intent and effect, which failed to riddle
the problems that disturbed even a bucolic age. Man does not live
by bread alone; but bread is a good current asset. At the same time
we are becoming increasingly critical of persistent obsession with
material things in excess of what we need or can enjoy. Man does
not live by bread and automobiles alone, as they who have nobler
objectives remind us.
They are glad enough to ameliorate their lot with social securities
unknown to their ancestors, even at some cost to their sometimes
rugged individualism. They are also ready, as such men have always
been, to band together against common danger. What they ask more
can be summed up in two aspirations. Pliant though they may be to
the regimentations that attend their age of wonders, they have the
age-old aspiration for some chance of self-fulfillment between the
cradle and the grave. They envisage the dance of life as something
more than a tribal dance, a way of life as something more than a folkway.
They also want enduring assurance of what men long despaired
of achieving and have sometimes achieved and lost-a society whose
laws operate equitably and without oppression of the individual. It
is this second aspiration that can infuse a judge's response to the need
for stabilizing the changes of our time.
One could make that response in many ways. One could respond
by signalling where judicial decisions are already reflecting major
social changes without loss to the continuity of the common law.'
We have, for example, come much of the way from caveat emptor to
caveat fabricator,2 and there are many signs of caveat sovereign immunity.3 We are taking a new look at contracts;4 it can make a difference now if one party has read and perhaps written the contract
and the other party cannot reasonably be expected to understand
its legal import even if he has read it.5 Property law keeps up in some
fashion with ingenious new ways of holding and transferring property.6
1. See LEVI,

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

LEGAL REASONING (1949); WAsSERSTROM, THE

JuDIciAxL DECISION (1961).
2. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. Adv. 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
3. See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.24 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 ( 1961) .
4. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
5. See Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. Adv. 109, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963);
Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
6. See Tanenbaum, The ABC Technique of Financing Real Estate Acquisitions: The
Tax Motivated Leasehold, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 161 (1962); Comment, Community
Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 299 (1962) .
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There is more talk of land use in the books than before.7 Family law
recognizes new responsibilities within the family as well as new
freedoms.8 Criminal law is beginning to take account of new insights
into human behavior.9 Wooden rules in conflicts of law are giving
way as surely as wooden boundary lines.10 Notable developments in
constitutional law attest the impact of the Bill of Rights on the
powers of the states and also the major changes in the relation of the
national government to the states." A heartening concomitant of
these developments is the growing disposition in the courts to make
fruitful use of scholarly research and comment.
On any legal subject there are usually experts better qualified than
the judge. What he can perhaps most appropriately speak of are
underdeveloped areas of the law where judges and scholars are only
beginning to marshal their resources for the hard tasks ahead. I shall
leave to others the large problems of international law. Within the
confines of domestic law, this brief response can direct itself to a
salient change in our society, the extraordinary growth of both the
state and of the private groups that now have so much to say about
how people shall lead their lives.' 2 What enlivens the picture in a
7. See HAR,

LAND-USE PLANNINc-A

CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE

(1959); Comment, Control of Urban Sprawl or Securing Open Space:
Regulation by Condemnation or by Ordinance?, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 483 (1962).
8. See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962);
Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962); Emery v. Emery,
45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250
P.2d 598 (1952).
9. See United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961); Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 366 P.2d 314,
16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959);
People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954); People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d
219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954); MODEL PENAL CODE-PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT (1962);
Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 650 (1958); Hall, The Scientific and Humane Study of Criminal
Law, 42 B.U.L. REV. 267 (1962); Marshall, Evidence, Psychology, and the Trial:
Some Challenges to Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 197 (1963).
10. See EHREWG, CONFLCT OF LAWS (1962); articles by Professor Currie set
forth in M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened
Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845 (1961); R. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?,
OF URBAN LAND

37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959).

See also CHEATHAM, PROBLEMS AND MIETHODS IN
from HAGUE~ ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

ConFLICT oF LAWS (1960), reprinted

I RECUELL DES COURs 1960, 237; Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the
Choice-of-Law Process-Some Notes on Shanahan, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1126 ( 1960) .
11. See A Symposium on Current Constitutional Problems, 4 VAND. L. REv. 399
( 1951) ; Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for S tate Prisoners,
76 H~ny. L. REv. 441 (1963), and articles cited therein; Brennan, The Bill of Rights
and the States, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761 (1961); Friedelbaum, The Warren Court and
American Federalism, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 53 (1960); Satterfield, Law and Lawyers in
a Changing World, 48 A.B.A.J. 922 (1962); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HAnV. L. REv. 1 (1956); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty
States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319.
BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY-A NEw DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN
POLTICAL ECONOMY (1959); BLOUGH, FREE MAN AND THE CORPORATION (1959);

12. See
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country like ours is that people are in the main better placed than
ever to amplify their own lives notwithstanding their increased obligations to others. For all the accounting the average citizen must do,
he has more disposable income than ever, more free time, more
opportunities for education, and more opportunities for self-expression
in leisure as well as in work. Like the state and the private groups,
he too is taller and fatter than Forefather. When he complains, it is
most often from a strength and a drive to optimum living conditions,
not from weakness and despair.
We can better understand his aspirations and grievances if we begin
by considering the state, which is theoretically the governing institution, though it actually interacts in countless ways with powerful
private groups, both to improve and to tax the lot of the citizen. We
can proceed thereafter to the groups that are also interacting with
one another as well as with the state. Then perhaps we can perceive
the main-traveled routes of the citizen in this moving picture, and
note how he seems to feel about keeping his various places in relation
to both the government and private groups. It is his feelings about
his status as he leads one to nine lives or more that will give us some
clues to the new rules courts will have to interpolate into so-called
settled law.
At least we have abundant and illuminating commentaries on the
nature of the modem state, whose laws divide and multiply. Professor
Arthur S. Miller gives it the evocative name of "Security State" and
explains:
By that term is meant the dual aspects of the 'Welfare State,' which this
nation has become during the past two decades, and the 'Garrison State,'
which this nation has in some measure approximated since the end of World
War II. The Security State gets its name from the fact that the chief
drives of Americans today appear to be the demands of the individual for
economic and psychic security which are subsumed under the notion of the
social-service or welfare principle of government, and the demands of people
generally (for our purposes here, the State) for national security (selfpreservation).13
CoiuarrTEE FOR Ecowome1x DEVELOPMENT, THE PuULC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABoR
POLICY (1961); EELLS, THE MEANN OF MODERN BUSINESs (1960); GRODIN, UNION
GOVERNMENT AND THE LAw ( 1961); HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONomeC
POWEn ( 1959); HARBRECHT & BERLE, TOWARD THE PARAPROPRIETAL SOCIETY ( 1960);
MiASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETrY ( 1960); MOORE, THE CONDUCT
OF THE CORPORATION (1962); O'NEAL & DERWIN, ExPvosion oR OPPRESSION OF
BUSINESs ASSOCIATES-"SQUEE~ZE-Ourrs" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES (1961); Chafee, The
Internal Agairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HAnv. L. REV. 993 (1930); Freedom
in the Modern American Economy: A Symposium, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 ( 1960);
Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 155 (1957); Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in
Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960); Wirtz, Government by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REV.
440 (1953).
13. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. REV. 620-22
(1958).
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I shall not go into problems of external security, particularly complex in this era of war not yet attainted and peace not yet attained.
Preoccupied though we currently are with garrison problems, it is
reasonable to hope that we will not be a garrison state forever. Even
in times of grave disturbance we can still keep our minds on the
enduring concerns of a peaceful society.
For a generation now our country has been committed, as all
modern states are, to expansive public services. However large may
be the disagreement about the wisdom or quality of particular services, few now yearn for the absent ways of laissez-faire rien. We have
learned to live very well without pervasive poverty, and we have
disproved the rationalization that it builds good character if not good
bones. The broadened avenues of welfare that have given concern to
such pessimists as Frederick A. Hayek have not terminated in the
boscage of serfdom. Indeed the evidence grows that some measure
of well-being tends to move more people up than down, with a consequent net gain, to a condition that fosters not only fitness but independence of spirit. Most people are not unlike A. A. Milne's king
who asked only for a little butter for his bread. When he got it, he
did not fall back like a serf, but bounced out of bed. No doubt the
enterprising dairymaid who went to fetch the butter, and who spoke
to royalty with great independence, also owed some of her spirit to
an excellent dairy supply.
There are of course diehards who still speak with alarm about the
effects of a little butter upon character. Often enough, however, they
prove not averse to keeping their own bread well buttered, and even
to calling for a little marmalade, on the ground that otherwise they
would have no incentive to work. Although the tax laws, among
others, have done much to accommodate them, there are no reports
that they are now marching down the road to serfdom in a trance of
grateful subservience to their paternal state.
Actually what is reassuring is the amount of grumbling a service
state suffers from its beneficiaries. The citizen who takes benefits for
granted has also to adjust to the demands of the state and the private
groups within it, but he does grumble, however innocuously, and
however helpless he may feel about remedying his grievances. Nor
is he without an audience. Government officials publicize how much
they want to hear from him; the much-maligned mass media send out
roving scribes to find out what is on his mind; the League of Women
Voters invites his questions on the issues of the day; and sooner or
later a law school institutes an inquiry into whatever legal problems
his vexations suggest.
Nevertheless his vexations continue. He finds circuitous or be-
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wildering the paths to various officialdoms empowered to exercise
over his affairs what we discreetly call discretion. We can do much
to modernize these paths, though we can hardly simplify them enough
to make them easy traveling for the average citizen so long as government, like private enterprise, is committed to ventures on a grand
scale.
In any event the achievements and failures of the social services
in the modern state belong primarily to the realm of politics. It is in
our best tradition that a judge keeps his distance from that realm.
He has nothing to do with formulating the statutes that specify what
services we shall have. He has nothing to do with formulating the
statutes that fail to specify how the services will be rendered. It is
not for him to determine whether the service is good or bad or to
gauge popular sentiment on the matter. He is not a supervisor and
he is not a pollster. He must assume a population adult enough to
look after its everyday affairs, even if his peripheral vision takes in
evidence to the contrary. He is not a counsellor-at-large. He cannot
be all things to all men and still be a good judge.
In his job of interpreting the multifarious statutes that have been
enacted in response to demands for expanded services from the state,
we can expect him to be on guard against any predilection for one
legislative objective or another, and likewise against any disapproving
bias. He can ordinarily presume legislation to be constitutional so
long as it does not move against the political processes of a free
society.14 His task is to interpret legislative language within the
narrows of legislative purpose. It is not for him to pass editorial
judgment on any circumstances indicating that the legislature responded to less than noble motivations in enacting what it did, even
as to legislation patently responsive to special interests. The public
alone can defeat its representatives when they speak only for special
groups. Somnolent though the public sometimes is, courts must bank
on the chance that eventually it will rouse itself to the cumuldtive
effect of statutes instigated and passed without regard for the public
interest. There is always one last sling that breaks the sleepwalker's
torpor.
Along with the traditional task of interpreting statutes, a court
confronts the responsibility of reviewing the decisions of a growing
number of administrative agencies. Time after time it must decide
14. See RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE (1962); Frantz, The First Amendment
in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some
Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HAuv. L. REV. 755 (1963);
Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 167 (1961);
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 34.
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whether agency wheels are turning within the orbit of legislative and
judicial power that a statute has delegated to an agency. Often the
orbit is so unconfined that a court must abandon thinking in terms
of the confines of a statute and concentrate instead on whether an
agency has been using its power temperately or administering to
excess. The test in judicial review then becomes constitutional rather
than statutory; however endowed with power an agency is, it must
still conform to due process.
Scholars like Walter Gellhorn have given us illuminating insights
into both statutory delegation of power to administrative agencies and
judicial review of that power.1 There is also widespread public
awareness that delegation of power to agencies is growing by leaps
and bounds, mainly because of what Harry Jones aptly calls "the
incidence of encounter between the individual and the state powerholder,"16 and because of a comparable incidence of encounter between private groups, such as corporations and unions, and the state
power-holder.
There is no comparable public awareness of how meager is judicial
review of administrative power. For the most part encounter with the
state power-holder is routine. The individual usually complies placidly
enough with the requirements for obtaining a library card or an
automobile license or a passport;" a group usually complies placidly
enough with various registration or reporting requirements. It is only
through an encounter that brings home a seemingly arbitrary or
downright unjust use of administrative power that the individual or
group is likely to learn, not only how much expense attends any
challenge of that power in court, but also how narrow are the paths
to judicial review.
Competent observers have noted that the courts themselves are
sometimes unduly deferential to what has curiously come to be known
as administrative expertise. It is one thing if they are deferring to a
technical appraisal in a specialized field. It is quite another if they
are deferring to the opinion of an administrator on a matter that
should be as much within the ken of judges as within his. Their very
deference on such matters suggests that they are not at all clear as to
15. See DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958); GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADPROCEEDINGS ( 1941); GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS ( 1956) ; Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from Federal
MINISTRATIVE

Trade Commission to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MIcH. L. REV. 199
(1960); Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition
of Standards (pts. 1-3), 75 HARV. L. REv. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962); Jaffe, Standing
To Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HAny. L. REV. 255 (1961); Jaffe,
Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265 (1961).
16. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM.

(1958).
17. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).

L. REV. 143, 154
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what expertise means. One might alternatively speculate that the
foreign word, indiscriminately used as it is, serves as an expedient
incantation for the abdication of judicial responsibility.
Such abdication is the more regrettable in situations where judicial
review could have served to uncover issues that were ignored or inadequately treated in the administrative stage. It could thus serve to
good purpose even in cases that appear on the surface to involve
primarily technical questions. A comprehensive technical evaluation
may have expertly skimmed the surface of the problem and never
touched its depths. Rendering a full accounting of the technical
aspects of a problem may fall far short of taking full account of its
legal aspects. A court should not then turn inferior and abdicate
its responsibility for review merely because the problem it confronts
calls for massive homework. It has an obligation to inquire, even
under pain of studying expert reports in an unfamiliar field, into
whether the administrative decision evinces a discriminating understanding of the legislative objective and an impartial and reasoned
application of the statute. To refrain from exercising its own expertness in such inquiry is to make a complainant's day in court depend
on the circumstance that his case is unriddled with substantial technical complications.
It nevertheless remains true that the broader the statutory delegation of administrative power, the broader is administrative discretion
and the narrower is the scope of judicial review. There is then all the
more reason why a court should have as much to say as ever about
the constraints of due process upon agency procedures.18 The greater
the power of an agency to affect people's lives, the more constrained
it should be by rules of due process commensurate with that power.
A court free of popular or private pressures is well situated to articulate such rules with relevance to a novel context. It can state the
constraints of due process in terms responsive to the new facts of
administrative life. It must do so as insurance that any individual or
group denied a fair day in an agency will have a fair day in court.
As Harry Jones perceptively observes, only in this way can we reconcile the formidable impingement of the welfare state upon the individual with the rule of law. In his view:
The rule of law is a tradition of decision, a tradition embodying at least
three indispensable elements: first, that every person whose interests will be
affected by a judicial or administrative decision has the right to a meaningful
'day in court'; second, that deciding officers shall be independent in the
full sense, free from external direction by political and administrative
superiors in the disposition of individual cases and inwardly free from the
18. See Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due Process," 49 CAuF. L. REV. 215
(1961).
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influence of personal gain and partisan or popular bias; and third, that
day-to-day decisions shall be reasoned, rationally justified, in terms that take
due account both of the demands of general principle and the demands
of the particular situation.1 9

He makes clear that a fair day in an administrative agency need
not parallel in every formality a fair day in court. Nevertheless he
rightly emphasizes that the basic requirements of proper notice and
opportunity to be heard mean not only that a claimant will be able
to state his case but that someone in real authority will study his case
"in good faith and high seriousness before the decision comes down.""
He also rightly insists on a "reasoned" decision rather than one purportedly "on principle," but actually "an undiscriminating and unjust
application of general policy to a concrete situation within its letter
but not within its spirit."2 1
One is moved to add that these are basic concerns of a court in
the review of decisions of administrative agencies. A person has not
had a fair hearing if the one in authority, given discretion to adjudge
the case in the ample terms of a general policy, has exercised his
discretionary power not with the realistic appropriateness that is the
very justification of such power, but with such harsh inappropriateness
as to mock the meaning of discretion. A court reviewing an alleged
abuse of discretion, and finding a prima facie case of arbitrariness,
must be alert to ascertain whether or not there emerges from the
record some reasonable explanation for the administrative decision.
We cannot take it for granted that because an authority is, he thinks.
The thought process, or the absence thereof, of the one in authority
has more than once been the key to determining the issue of due
process in administrative proceedings. 2
Even if courts actively exercise their reviewing power, there still
remains for others the problem of making the administrative agencies
operate efficiently and with real commitment to the legislative objectives they are created to serve. We are indebted to such scholars
as Walter Gellhorn and Kenneth Davis for their constructive proposals
to insure administrative operations commensurate with capacity.
They have suggested the interesting possibility of "Ombudsmen in
America ,"23 comparable to those who serve in Scandinavian countries
19. Jones, s'upra note 16, at 145.
20. Id. n.4.
21. id. n.5.
22. See California Motor Transp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 59 Cal. Adv. 283, 379 P.2d
324, 28 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1963).

23. Davis, Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Action, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1961); Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy
Perennial, 48 A.B.A.J. 243 (1962); see also SENATE CoMMrITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
86TH CONG., 2D SEss.; J. M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT 86 (Comm. Print

1960).
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and in Finland, to improve as well as to investigate administrative
procedures. They note how much such men could do to foster clear
standards for the implementation of vaguely defined administrative
powers. Unlike courts, which can hear only isolated controversies,
Ombudsmen would have freedom to investigate complaints even of
ponderous or apathetic administration, to recommend changes as well
as to criticize, and to publicize recommendations as well as criticisms.
Briefly, they would be as concerned with the fevers brought on by
the frustrations of cumbersome routine or the slow poison of listless
routine as with outright injustice.
Now and again it fortuitously proves of benefit to the individual
that the government agencies which crowd in upon his life also
crowd in on private groups usually better situated than he is to
complain about official proceedings. To the extent that such groups
vindicate legal rights akin to his own, they make him the incidental
beneficiary of their resources for effective complaint. Moreover, their
superior power keeps alive, on his behalf as well as their own, a
healthy critical spirit regarding official Establishments. Any servant
of the public will usually think twice before daring an attempt at
tyranny when he knows that his public encompasses private groups
of significant strength.
The influence of such groups is not always so beneficent. As they
continue to grow stronger their leaders tend to develop a force of
their own that is more than the sum of the strength of those they
purport to speak for. They come to speak with the multiplex voice
of authority and then to equate their authority with a divinity homely
enough to appear consonant with the democratic way of life even
when most antipathetic to it.
Moreover, as the decision-makers in the unofficial Establishments,
they crowd in on the individual as does the state. Within their own
groups their word becomes law, and against any arbitrary power
they may exercise the individual is likely to stand very much alone.
It is noticeable how passively he has come to acquiesce in a multitude
of unofficial decisions that affect his life. It is also understandable.
A person without an effective voice at the council tables is not in a
position to do anything but acquiesce if a corporation decision dilutes
his equity as a shareholder or affects his franchise as a dealer, or if a
union decision constrains his opportunities as a wage earner. He
usually has little recourse against the subtle pressures that can be
brought against him by those in control of all that is loosely described
as the internal affairs of a corporation or union. The route from the
closed sessions of such a private group to the distant open courtroom
is arduous and often impassable.
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Even the exceptional man, well able to set forth his disagreement
with the decision-makers of his groups, usually learns that his is a
voice crying in the togetherness. Worse still, unheeded though it may
be, it risks being vilified as the tantrum of a troublemaker. The
ordinary law-abiding soul with valid questions to ask is likely to keep
them to himself for fear of being labeled with a scarlet "T." It is bad
enough to be a helpless man, but worse still to be a marked one.
Moreover, he may be no less daunted about expressing disagreement privately, given still serious risks. The exclusionary rule that
militates against state invasions of privacy has been given virtually
no application against unofficial invasions instigated by groups as
freely as by individuals."2 Unless people take care to censor themselves, such invasions afford opportunities for wholesale vilification
that few would have time or energy or resources to challenge in court.
Even a member of the public without any close relation to decisionmaking groups may suffer the consequences of their decisions. He
finds it small comfort that a powerful union and a powerful corporation may counter each other forcefully if in the end they join to make
a decision at his expense. The decisions of other influential groups
may insinuate themselves into his life directly or indirectly. The
consumer as well as the member producer or distributor may suffer
the effects of what a trade association decides. On occasion the
public may be adversely affected by less than noble decisions of
professional associations. Even charitable foundations, as they grow
in resources and power, make decisions whose repercussions bear
watching, particularly because their influence, together with that of
government and industry, plays a large part in determining how far
research is to be applied rather than pure, and to what ends?'5 We
must also reckon with the many influential voluntary associations that
purport to speak on behalf of all their members, as we remain mindful
of how seldom a dissident comes forth to state his disagreement publicly.
The evidence mounts that the leaders in these private groups now
exercise power in some measure comparable to that of public officers;
yet their decisions are ordinarily not open to comparable public
criticism unless they have immediate and substantial impact upon the
public, and even then criticism is likely to prove ineffectual in the
absence of legal remedies. Insofar as the decision-makers of a group
24. See Burdean v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App.
Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GuRT-REsTmICrONS
UPON ITs DiscovmY OR COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE 209-17 (1959); Note, 48 CORNELL

L.Q. 345 (1963).

25. See Friedmann, supra note 12, at 160-63; Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 4, 16 (1960).
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affect mainly the interests of some one or more of its members they
are likely to escape public notice altogether, even if what they decide
has long range public repercussions. There is as yet little general
concern for due process outside the realm of state action. The public
has yet to understand how freighted with public interest may be the
injury to an individual denied a fair hearing in the sessions of a private
group regarding interests perhaps as important to him as any he would
assert against the state. For all our vigilance against official tyranny
we have yet to take full account of how majestic the decision-makers
of some private groups have become, how arbitrary their procedures
can sometimes be, and how inadequate internal or external controls
may be to insure some private equivalent of due process.
There is nevertheless a lively interest among scholars in possible
remedies;Z they may be harbingers of public sentiment more articulate
than the occasional wishful statement that there ought to be a law.
There is inquiry into the possibilities of extending the public utility
concept to various private groups in their relations with the public.
There is also inquiry into the possibilities of extending the reach of
the due process clause to such activities as bear primarily on individuals, within or without the group, through an expanded connotation
of state action. Given the new affairs of state and the new states of
affairs, the line between public and private activity is becoming increasingly blurred. Already we have substantial articulation of the
responsibilities of a state that undertakes activities characteristically
associated with private enterprise. We can expect more articulation
of the responsibilities of private groups that operate in a sovereign
manner.
It would not be judicious of a judge to rush in where scholars are
treading warily, and where there are not yet enough cases to serve
26. See Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORNEL L.Q. 375 (a1958); Alfange, "Under Color of Law:" Classic
and Screws Revisited, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 395 (1962); Barnett, What is "State" Action
Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?,
24 ORE. L. REv. 227 ( 1945) ; Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate ActivityProtection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 933 (1952); Henkin, Shelly v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110
U. PA. L. REV. 473 ( 1962) ; Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under
the Fourteenth Amend ment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 ( 1957) ; Kadish, Methodology and
Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319
( 1957) ; Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REv. 433 ( 1960); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM.
L. REV. 1083 (1960); Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law?, 30 CEO.
WASH. L. REv. 399 (1962); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University
Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 368 (1963); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. REV.
347 (1963); Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1963).
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as aids to navigation.27 It is for him not to predict but to await what
cases may materialize to challenge the supposition that there is no
right without a clearly visible remedy. However unexpected may be
their disorderly appearance from a recessed area, they are likely to
afford some timely clues to the group context from which they
emerge, enough perhaps to construct a hypothesis as to how right the
asserted right looks in context. If it then appears worthy of a remedy,
it will compel inquiry into whether there are adequate unofficial
remedies available that would render official intervention unnecessary.
If not, a court must resolve the problem of devising an official remedy
befitting the right and also befitting the easy ways appropriate to
unofficialdom.
It is the perennial responsibility of a court to worry its way through
just such a seeming dilemma to a solution that enables one competing
interest to adjust to another without undue sacrifice, or that even
sacrifices one interest if it is demonstrably unworthy of legal protection. There is no great quarrel with a solution that proceeds from
realistic reasoning if it is reasonably clearly set forth. There can be
serious quarrel, however, even with a decision that appears just on
its face, if it floats in language so inadequate or ambiguous as to afford
no clear insight into the nature of the competing interests, no clear
vision of their relation to the contemporary environment, and hence
no reliable clues for the determination of cases involving kindred
competing interests in dissimilar fact contexts.
Nevertheless one can hardly expect that a court can or should
invariably afford crystal-clear guidance as to the availability of remedies for injuries proceeding from the everyday public operations of
private groups or from their more limited activities in a private or
semi-private environment. Even though it may seem reasonably clear
to a court that legal concepts seem destined to expand as both
official and unofficial activities expand and dovetail, it still has no
way of divining a concept's optimum tolerance for expansion at a
27. See Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961); Local 473, Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 ( 1961); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 ( 1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); King v. Grand Lodge of the
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 215 F. Supp. 351 ( D.C.N.D. 1963); Rosner v. Eden Township
Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 ( 1962); Marshall v.
International Longshoremen's Union, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211
( 1962); Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 368 P.24 101, 18
Cal. Rptr. 501 (1962); Black v. Cutter Labs., 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); De Mille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.
2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d
329 (1944); Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Med. Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241,
293 P.2d 862 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 390 (1963); Tobriner,
Social Responsibility of Law and Lawyers, The Recorder (San Francisco), Jan. 30, Jan.
31, Feb. 1, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 1, cols. 1 & 2.
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given moment in a given situation. The cases themselves are not
likely to arrive in well-arranged clusters to present the interlocking
aspects of growth situations in the law. A court that must hence guard
its language against inappropriate application does not always achieve
a very happy medium between expansive and wizened language, let
alone the most felicitous statement for the instant case and its close
kin. The critics who perceive how a court could have rendered a
decision on all fours with the future as well as on time are well
situated to spell out how. On the shuttles of how, they can reconnoiter in all directions with the leisure and freedom denied to a court
preoccupied with the record before it.
The quiet hum of such shuttles is a welcome sound to a court in
the tumult of the not altogether bright new day. Its own perspectives
grow larger as the scholars report on theirs. It can make good use of
their reconnoiters, immersed as it is in litigation that continues to
increase despite the growth of preventive counseling and private
settlements. Quite apart from the tasks of interpreting countless
statutes and of reviewing countless administrative decisions, a court
must keep pace with the cases involving the common law, no mean
responsibility in traditional areas, to say nothing of the ones that are
opening up. It would be a savage waste not to marshal all the
available resources of scholarship for law and justice that transcend
hack law and a semblance of order."
In the interest of coherence as well as efficiency, it is for the courts
to consign to oblivion what has proved over the years to be chaff.
Now that space and time are at a premium for the storage and study
of even superlative matter, it is folly to clutter and confuse work
papers with materials that are either obsolete or repetitious or ridden
with inept or fallacious analysis that cannot survive the light of reason.
Less than ever can we assume that all the good enough thoughts and
ways of yesterday are adequate today, however superbly undated
some remain. What is indelibly dated as of yesterday may now be a
light-year's distance from problems that reach deep into tomorrow.
There is no place in the living law for period pieces or parrot paragraphs or ill-conceived figments of what has passed as legal imagination.
Important as it is for judges to clear the desks for a new day's
problems, it is still more important that they restate their judicial
responsibilities lest the new day become a Walpurgis Night. Their
modem responsibilities are less than is commonly believed and more
28. See Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7 UTAH L. REV.
157, 169-70 (1960).
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than is commonly imagined." It is commonly believed, though the
legal profession knows better, that the decisions of a day in court are
reflex arcs of the wisdom of the ages, just as it is commonly believed
that the ages have been wise. In this vision judges have a ceaseless
responsibility at the switchboard of time to make all possible connections between incoming calls and outgoing ancestors. They are
pictured as having such skill and luck at their busy posts that rarely
do they have to report that the number they have called is no longer
in service or that the line is dead.
If judicial responsibility is actually not so incessantly tedious, it
does demand insight together with exactitude of a high order. The
judge's task of developing law, at once stable and creative, is hard
enough when he is constrained to write on an untidy slate; it may be
harder still when he has to write on a clean one. He can only hope
that the legislature is working out on its large blackboards some
comprehensive solutions for the large problems that cannot be solved
properly on a case-to-case basis. Even then he can expect consequent
problems of statutory interpretation as novel as those emerging everywhere in the common law.
For all the great expansion of statutory law, indeed, in part because of it, a judge has key responsibility for the well-being of the
law. If he tends it badly or merely passively, it can develop weaknesses or disorders or, worse still, frightening powers, no matter how
well put together it is. If he tends it well it will thrive, even if it is
of clumsy structure. So long as it thrives it gives both evidence and

assurance of a society healthy enough to manage its anxieties and
to resolve its conflicts in open and orderly ways.
One might add a postscript that well-tended courtrooms connote
more than open doors and seemingly orderly procedures. Open doors
have an ironic appearance to those who must wait years to enter
them. Purportedly orderly procedures that involve superfluous capers
and needless intricacies seem tinged with madness to those who must
comply with them in the name of the law. Even those willing to
endure the inexcusable delays and complications that too often con29. See AUERBACH, GARRISON, HUnsT & MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS ( 1961);
( 1960); Clark & Trubek, The Creative
the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE
in
and
Freedom
Restraint
Role of the Judge:
L.J. 255 ( 1961); Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 CoLvU.
L. REV. 821 (1961); Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE
L.J. 218 (1961); McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial PolicyMaking, 39 MIN. L. REV. 837 (1955); Sentell, The Opinions of Hughes and Sutherland and the Rights of the Individual, 15 VAND. L. REV. 559 (1962); Shapiro, Judicial
Modesty, Political Reality, and Preferred Position, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 175 (1962);
Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; Or Hard Cases Can Make Good Law, 29
U. Cm. L. REV. 223 (1962), and articles cited therein.
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dition access to a courtroom may be discouraged or deterred by N
attendant costs.
We do not lack first-rate proposals for court organization and administration and procedures that would befit a new day. Neither do
we lack well-conceived plans for the selection and retention of judges
that would attract able and independent men to the bench. Nevertheless, the few states that have undertaken substantial reforms are
far outnumbered by those that have not. It is high time to inquire
why there has been such a woeful lack of will in the legal profession
throughout the country to have done with ways so antiquated as
chronically to impede the just operation of the laws. It is a fair speculation that if bar associations were to unite wholeheartedly with
judicial institutes and law school groups to follow up the splendid
statements of Law Days with sustained efforts to achieve needed
reforms, we would have them.
Meanwhile, well-tempered judges will do the best they can, whatever their working conditions, to stabilize the explosive forces of the
day. They know that they can do little enough to bring on the
millenium, but they will do everything within their power of reasoning
to make each day in court lead constructively to the next one and to
set an example approaching what a civilized day could be.

